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Western Spies 
in the Levant
In  the fifteenth century, the growing 
power o f the Turks prompted a
number o f European princes to 
despatch emissaries to the Levant 
as intelligence officers on the 
Eastern Question.
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The conqueror o f Byzantium, the sultan MOHAMMED 
II (14 51-8 1)
The steady advance of the Ottoman Turks in south-eastern Europe during the fifteenth century was the cause of 
successive crises and recurrent alarms in Latin 
Christendom. Popes and preachers of the 
crusade, princes, diplomats and publicists, 
repeatedly warned of the imminent danger to 
the West. They denounced the Turks as cruel 
barbarians, the enemies of civilization and true 
religion, and proclaimed the need for peace 
among Christians and for a joint expedition 
against the infidels.
Modern scholars have often disputed the 
sincerity of these declarations. The Turkish 
threat, they have pointed out, served as a pre­
text for raising funds and recommending the 
selfish policies of rulers and churchmen who 
had no serious interest in the Eastern problem, 
and, indeed, no accurate knowledge of Turkish 
affairs. Yet, at the same time, in the hearts of 
many Christians, the mystique of the crusade 
undoubtedly lingered on. Through a powerful 
personality such as St. John Capistran, it 
inspired a rag-tag band under John Hunyadi
to resist the assaults of the Sultan’s armies at 
Belgrade in 1456. It also stirred ecclesiastical 
statesmen of the highest order, men like 
Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini and Cardinal Juan 
Carvajal. Even secular rulers fell, i f  only tem­
porarily, beneath its influence, and pledged 
themselves and their kingdoms to its support.
Most fifteenth-century Western princes had 
a realistic appreciation of Turkish power. The 
Turks had already done grave damage to the 
commerce of the Mediterranean states; and, 
both in Asia and in Europe, they had a long and 
imposing record of military successes. But, for 
the “ new monarchs,”  the central question 
concerned the security of the West. How effec­
tive, European sovereigns asked, were the Turks 
judged by Western standards; and how much 
credence should be given to the Sultans’ alleged 
intention of conquering Europe and founding a 
universal monarchy ? What were their probable 
courses of action, and what counter-action was 
required to check them ?
To solve these problems, few Renaissance 
rulers were content to rely on rumour and report
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alone. In their search for up-to-date informa­
tion, they utilized a large variety of sources; 
and in their voluminous correspondence, with 
one another and with their representatives, they 
regularly requested and transmitted the latest 
news. During the endless negotiations on the 
subject of a possible crusade, they exchanged 
information and ideas. Before the fall of Con­
stantinople, Greek embassies, seeking aid 
against the Turks, appeared frequently in the 
West, bearing reports of the Ottoman advance; 
while embassies from the Christian states in 
the Levant, and from anti-Turkish Moslem 
powers, visited the courts of Europe. Through­
out the fifteenth century, a steady stream of 
refugees and adventurers made their way to the 
West, bringing with them first-hand knowledge. 
The princes most directly involved, the Popes, 
their Italian colleagues, and the Duke of 
Burgundy, Philip the Good, carried on their 
own ambitious researches. They demanded 
reports from merchants and diplomats, who 
now commonly played a double role as spies. 
They employed translators and scholars to 
process the intelligence gathered, and directed 
military experts to analyse the results. Finally, 
they sent out special espionage agents, of whom 
three will be described here.
In the spring of 1421, at the request of the 
Duke of Burgundy and the King of England, 
Ghillebert de Lannoy with seven companions 
set out for the Levant. The precise terms of his 
commission are not fully known. But crusade- 
talk was running high; and embassies, dealing 
with the old questions of church union and 
western aid against the Turks, were being 
exchanged between the papacy and Byzantium. 
The evidence found in Lannoy’s own account 
of his journey suggests that he was charged with 
a double task: to visit the East-European 
Christian rulers and inform them of the willing­
ness of the sovereigns he was representing to 
participate in the crusade, and to urge them to 
compose their differences. Clearly, he was in­
structed to travel through the Mediterranean 
territories under Moslem rule, and to observe 
and report his findings. It is certain that he was 
directed to visit the court of the Turkish Sultan, 
Mehmed I. As he crossed eastern Europe, he 
took care to secure letters of safe conduct from 
Christian princes on friendly terms with the
Turks. Furthermore, he carried a gold clock 
as a present for the Sultan from the King o f 
England.
An experienced soldier, diplomat, and 
councillor to Philip the Good, Lannoy was an 
ardent traveller and an inveterate sightseer. 
He had already been to Prussia and had cam­
paigned with the Teutonic Knights. He had 
visited Poland, Russia, and Hungary. When not 
occupied with fighting, he went out of his way 
to visit villages, castles, palaces, and other 
“  beautiful and admirable things to see.”  Nor 
was he unacquainted with the affairs of the 
Moslem world. He had visited the Holy Land 
as a youth, and had participated in two expedi­
tions against the Moslems in Spain.
Lannoy led his small party east across North 
Germany, by way of Hamburg and Lübeck, to 
Danzig where he discussed the crusade with 
the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights. 
From Danzig he travelled south-east into 
Poland; and King Ladislas gave him letters of 
safe conduct, but warned against travel in 
Turkey because of a fierce civil war then raging. 
Lannoy continued his journey through Poland 
and Moldavia, surviving an attack by brigands 
and an encounter with hostile Tartars, finally 
reached Kaffa on the Black Sea and took ship 
for Constantinople. In the Byzantine capital, 
he appeared before the Emperors Manuel II 
and his son John V III, who seventeen years 
later was to travel to Ferrara and Florence as 
an advocate of church union and a new crusade. 
Lannoy discussed these and other problems 
with the Emperors, was richly entertained, but 
prevented from going to the Turkish court. He 
therefore sailed to Rhodes, and then to Crete, 
after which he journeyed through Egypt, Syria 
and Palestine. Having returned home, he sub­
mitted a copy of his Rapports sur les vcyaiges de 
pluisieurs villes, ports et rivières que je  fis en l'an 
vingt-deux, tant en Égypte comme en Surie to 
Duke Philip, and went to London to deposit 
another at the English court.
Ghillebert de Lannoy’s work has little in 
common with most of the numerous plans for 
a crusade produced during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. It is a careful intelligence 
study, a sober and factual description of pro­
posed areas of operation. Its author includes 
detailed information about harbours, port
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facilities, fortifications, demography, and poli­
tical, social, and economic conditions. It is 
almost completely free from the fanciful notions 
that the majority of his generation held. His 
tales about Prester John, and his placing the 
source of the Nile in India and in the Earthly 
Paradise are notable exceptions.
He begins with an account of the port of 
Alexandria as one approaches it from the sea, 
describes its configuration and its position in 
relation to the city, and gives exact figures on 
the depth of the harbour. Lannoy enumerates 
the walls, brays, fosses, and towers on the sea­
ward side of the city, and points out that, be­
tween the old and new ports, there is a strip of 
land, about a mile in length, on which are 
located mosques and cemeteries, and which, 
he suggests, might be used as a beach-head. He 
depicts Alexandria as a very large and impres­
sive city, enclosed with high walls bristling with 
many towers. The city, he writes, is seated on 
firm soil, conducive to successful mining opera­
tions. But the fortifications and houses are all
constructed of a soft stone that crumbles easily. 
He explains how the city is supplied with water 
once a year by a canal from the Nile. Although 
many people are to be seen in the narrow 
streets, the place is largely depopulated and 
many of its buildings are in ruins. Lannoy 
concludes with a note on the Christian com­
munity and its treatment by its Moslem rulers.
Rosseta, Damietta and Cairo he treats in a 
similar fashion. The latter city, unlike Alex­
andria, is heavily populated, and a great centre 
of international trade. After giving an account 
of the lay-out of Cairo and its defences, he 
turns to the government of the Mamelukes and 
its military organization, analyses the rigid 
class-structure of Egyptian society and tells of 
the wretched condition of the native population, 
of the warlike nature of the Arabs in the 
countryside, and of the plight of the Christian 
minority groups. Next, he contrasts the topo­
graphy and peoples of Egypt with those of 
Syria. He then provides a careful survey of the 
Nile, from above Cairo to Damietta. In Syria
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and Palestine he describes the terrain, harbours, 
and fortifications of Jaffa, Acre, Sur, Saida, and 
Beirut, and inland the town of Rama, and the 
cities of Jerusalem and Damascus.
Since he had been prevented from visiting 
Turkey, Lannoy includes little information 
about the Ottoman military régime; but he 
explains the causes of the civil war then being 
fought among the relatives of the deceased 
Mehmed I, and the rôle that the Greeks played 
in it. Having passed Gallipoli on his way to 
Rhodes, he is able to say something of its forti­
fications and harbour facilities, and notes that
it was the Turks’ main naval base. He also de­
scribes the fortress opposite Gallipoli on the 
Asian shore which controlled the passage to 
and from the two continents, commenting 
that, if  an enemy held it, the Turks would have 
“  no sure passage from one to the other.”
Less than ten years after Lannoy’s return, 
Philip the Good charged another of his court 
councillors with a similar assignment. Like his 
predecessor, Bertrandon de la Broquiere was 
knowledgeable in military and civilian affairs. 
His official report, entitled Le Voyage 
d’Outremer, shows its author as a spirited, dar­
ing, and resourceful personality, possessing 
extraordinary powers of observation and judg­
ment. La Broquiere sailed from Venice aboard 
a pilgrim galley on May 8th, 1432. He went to 
the holy places in and about Jerusalem and 
travelled extensively in Palestine and Syria, 
visiting Acre, Nazareth, Beirut, and Damascus. 
It was at Damascus that he gained the con­
fidence of a Turk named Khodja Baraq, the 
leader of a Moslem pilgrim caravan travelling 
from Mecca to the old Turkish capital of 
Brusa. The Turk allowed La Broquiere to join 
the caravan; and he disguised himself in 
Turkish dress—vermilion boots with spurs 
attached, fustian drawers, a linen girdle, a long 
white robe, and a white turban. He purchased 
a horse, tarquais, Damascus blade, which he 
greatly prized, and a kettle drum. In Damascus, 
too, where he met Jacques Coeur,1 La Broquiere 
obtained a makeshift Turkish vocabulary from 
a Jewish merchant; and, on his first night out, 
he read from his list the appropriate phrases 
for obtaining barley and straw, much to the 
amusement of his Ottoman companions. These 
fellow travellers befriended him and began 
teaching him their language; so that, by the 
time he reached Brusa, he no longer needed his 
vocabulary. He notes that from Antioch on to 
Brusa the natives all spoke Turkish, which, he 
adds, is “  a very beautiful language, concise and 
easy enough to understand.”
Of the Turks themselves, La Broquiere has 
much to say. He observes that they are accus-
1 Jacques Coeur (1395 ?-i456), French merchant 
who had established a large-scale trade with the 
Levant; from about 1436 in charge of French royal 
finances.
750
tomed to a rough life, subsisting on little and 
disregarding physical comforts. Yet they main­
tain a pleasant disposition, entertaining them­
selves with songs that commemorate their past 
history and the deeds of native heroes. They 
are also generous and willingly share their food 
with strangers, a thing that Christians never 
do! They are a handsome people; the men 
bearded and of medium height and strength. 
He adds, however, that the common saying,
“  as strong as a Turk,”  is not accurate; for he 
believes that most Christians were more than 
their match. They are, none the less, diligent, 
well disciplined and practical. La Broquiere 
discusses their religion, but acknowledges that 
the Turks do not always live up to it. He tells 
an amusing story of a drinking party he 
attended with five Turks at the home of a Greek 
in Hamah, the ancient Epiphania, which almost 
ended in a brawl.
At Kutahieh his career as an intelligence 
agent nearly came to an end. A Turkish official 
from the court of Alaeddin Ali, son of Sultan 
Murad II, and governor of the province of 
Amassia, recognized La Broquiere as a Wes­
terner and accused him of being a spy. The 
Turk declared that, if  he were a pilgrim or a 
merchant, he would have returned home by 
ship from Syria. La Broquiere gave the excuse 
that the Venetians and Genoese were at war, 
and that the sea-route was unsafe. Apparently 
the Turk was reassured; and, when he learned 
that La Broquiere came from Burgundy, his 
interest was aroused; for he declared that he 
himself had been to the West, visited Paris, and 
served under a mercenary captain named 
Barnabo; at which the astonished Burgundian 
conjectured that “  he was one of those who had 
been taken prisoner in the battle of Hungary, 
when my lord Duke John was prince.”
From Kutahieh the caravan moved on to 
Brusa, which La Broquiere described at some 
length. He was particularly impressed by a 
large castle belonging to Murad II. He learned 
that the Sultan housed some fifty wives there, 
and came often to amuse himself by boating 
with them. He also visited a market place where 
Christian slaves were sold, and lamented the 
pitiful sight of Christian men and women 
squatting in rows on benches waiting to be 
purchased. Travelling in the company of
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The Turkish siege of Constantinople as illustrated in 
La Broquière’s L e  Voyage d’Outremer
Genoese merchants, he continued to Pera, 
where he met a Milanese ambassador named 
Benedetto Folco da Forli, on his way to the 
Sultan’s court to negotiate a peace between 
Hungary and the Turks, who allowed La 
Broquiere to accompany him. After a short 
stay in Constantinople, they set out for Adria- 
nople where they appeared before the Sultan.
La Broquiere draws a vivid picture of the 
Porte of the Grand Turk. He describes Murad 
as short and stocky, having the face of a Tartar, 
with high cheek bones, dark complexion, a 
large crooked nose, little eyes, and a round
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beard. The Sultan’s pleasures include hunt­
ing, women, boys and, especially, wine. But 
he is a kind, generous, and peaceful ruler, which 
is lucky for Christendom: if  the Sultan were to 
mobilize all his forces, he would have no 
trouble in seizing much of Europe. La Bro- 
quière praises the Sultan’s government, and 
discusses the administration of justice, the 
system of taxation, the rules of the pashas, the 
organization of the Porte, its officials and its 
protocol.
Thence he proceeds to an analysis of the 
Turkish army, its composition, weapons, and 
tactics. The Sultan could raise in Greece an 
army of 120,000 men, which included 4,000 or 
5,000 of his own slaves. About half this force, 
or 60,000 men, La Broquière considered to be 
effective and well armed, each man having a 
horse, tarquais and sword. The rest were not 
worth much, poorly armed and unhorsed, in 
some instances carrying no more than a club. 
To muster this force, the Sultan must pay eight 
aspers to each cavalryman and five aspers to 
the foot soldiers. La Broquière also showed 
great interest in the condition of the Sultan’s
finances. The ruler collected annually 2,500,000 
ducats in rents and tribute, and according to 
one source, then had a treasury of 1,000,000 
ducats, but, according to another, only half that 
much. The wealth of his slaves and his women 
our agent estimated at 1,000,000 in gold; his 
plate he valued at the same figure. He con­
cluded that, were the Grand Turk to give 
nothing away for a single year, he would save 
1,000,000 ducats. As for the troops of his 
household, numbering 5,000, both cavalry and 
infantry, he merely paid them their wages. 
Beyond these forces, there were 30,000 men in 
Greece, holding land from the Sultan, who 
were ordered to hold themselves ready to fight 
wherever he led them. Similarly, he had 
awarded a number of great seigniories in 
Turkey, whose owners occupied them on 
sufferance and were bound to serve him with a 
certain number of men. In time of war, the 
troops raised from such sources cost him no 
more than in peace time. Indeed, when the 
Sultan mobilized, he made money, because the 
troops from Turkey, when crossing to Greece, 
had to pay the comarch five aspers per horse
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and three per man. I f  they crossed the Danube, 
they paid similar sums. The Sultan also had 
the right to claim one-fifth of all prisoners of 
war. Finally, La Broquiere noted that a large 
part of the army, which had been recently in 
Greece, was made up of Christians from Serbia, 
Albania, Bulgaria, and elsewhere, and that 
many Christian slaves fought in the Turkish 
ranks.
In Greece La Broquiere witnessed several 
mass conversions of Greek Christians to Islam. 
The Turkish soldiers turned out in full dress, 
and paraded through the towns with loud fan­
fares. On these occasions, they wore handsome 
coats of mail, made of tiny links; and, to our 
Burgundian traveller, they resembled pictures 
he had seen of the soldiers of Julius Caesar. 
Their armour reached half way down the thigh, 
and had attached to it a piece of silk cloth 
which fell to the calf of the legs. They wore 
pointed white head pieces, half a foot in height, 
to which were secured four pieces of metal, or 
clinques, on the front, back, and two sides, 
designed to ward off sword-blows. Over these 
helmets they usually wore another head piece 
made of iron wire. Many were richly decorated 
and cost from forty to fifty ducats, while others 
cost only a ducat or two, but were strong 
enough to resist the cut of a sword.
The richer Turkish soldiers carried a bow, 
tarquais, and sword, the last an excellent 
weapon. Some also carried a large mace, a 
brutal instrument, especially when used against 
an unprotected shoulder or arm. Some Turks 
had small wooden bucklers, which covered 
them well on horseback when they used the 
bow, at which they were most expert. The 
Turkish soldier, he reported, was highly 
obedient to his commander, for disobedience 
might have been punished by death. La 
Broquiere, who was much impressed with the 
high degree of discipline maintained in the 
Sultan’s army, attributed the better part of the 
Turks’ successes to this fact: “ . . . it is one 
of the things to which they owe their greatest 
triumphs and conquests in war, far surpassing, 
alas, those of the kingdom of France.”  Turkish 
military intelligence, like their discipline, was 
superior to that of Western armies. They 
always knew in advance, wrote the Burgundian, 
when any Christian power was going to attack
them. With this foreknowledge, the Grand 
Turk assembled his forces two or three days’ 
journey from the place where he expected to 
meet his enemy. Meanwhile, his scouts 
watched the enemy’s movements. Then, sud­
denly, in a surprise manoeuvre, the Turks 
sprang upon them. In executing this action, 
such secrecy was maintained that one hundred 
Christian soldiers made more noise than ten 
thousand Turks. They began their movement 
from an assembly area, then proceeded to a 
line of departure from which they launched 
their attack. To the beating of a kettle-drum, 
the leading troops marched off and were fol­
lowed by the rest in continuous file. Their 
horses were especially trained for this type of 
action. Being lightly armed, the Turks were 
able in one night of forced marching to cover 
the same distance they would normally cover 
in three days.
When they arrived at the place selected to 
meet the enemy, they divided into several 
groups. The number and size of the groups 
depended on how numerous they were, and on 
the condition of the terrain. They then pre­
pared an ambush. Scouts mounted on swift 
horses were sent out to determine the enemy’s 
disposition. I f  the enemy were found to be in 
disorder, the Turks seized the initiative and 
assaulted at once. I f  they found the enemy to 
be drawn up in battle order, they would skirt 
the edges of his line, riding swiftly, but all the 
while firing their arrows with deadly accuracy. 
They would continue firing with great intensity 
for a long time, until they had thrown the enemy 
into disorder. I f  their opponents attempted to 
counter-charge, the Turks would fall back and 
disperse, still using their bows effectively 
against their pursuers. As soon as the enemy 
pursuing them had broken formation, the 
Turkish commander gave three raps on his 
kettledrum. The other Turks responded in like 
manner, and re-formed around their leader. I f  
the enemy were sufficiently disorganized, the 
T  urks stood their ground, andreceived his assault. 
If, however, the enemy were still well con­
stituted in one body, the Turks divided once 
again into groups and assaulted their opponents 
at different points. One means by which they 
disorganized the enemy’s troops was to throw 
fire among their horses. Another tactic was to
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station camels or dromedaries in front of their 
line. Driven into the enemy’s cavalry, they 
stampeded their mounts.
By such methods, La Broquiere declared, 
the Turks had defeated Christian armies in the 
past. Although they usually achieved victories 
with armies of 100,000 or 120,000, or even 
200,000, these numbers were not so impressive 
as they might seem. Many Turkish soldiers 
were poorly armed; and a considerable element 
of the Turkish army was always made up of 
Christians, who, La Broquiere insisted, would 
defect, if  they witnessed the appearance of a 
respectable Christian force. La Broquiere 
admitted that he had found the Turks a frank, 
loyal, and valiant race; but, he asserted, they 
were not invincible. A well-ordered army from 
the West, only half the size of the Turkish 
army, acquainted with their manner of fighting 
had every reason to expect victory.
On the basis of his observations, La Bro­
quiere drew up a proposal for the conduct of an 
expedition. His recommendations included the 
following points, which he believed were essen­
tial: (1) combatants were to be recruited from 
England, France, and Germany, and were to 
consist of men-of-arms, crossbowmen and 
archers: (2) the troops were to be paid regularly 
for their services; (3) they were not to be 
allowed to take anything from the lands through 
which they travelled without paying for it;
(4) they were all to be lightly armed, and he 
detailed just what weapons they should carry;
(5) the army was to remain in one compact unit 
and under no circumstances was it to be 
divided; (6) when the Christians engaged the 
Turks in battle, their advance and rear guards 
were to take up new positions to protect their 
flanks; the archers were to be mixed through­
out the main body, and used as skirmishers; 
the knights were not to be permitted to skir­
mish; lightly armed troops were to be placed in 
front of and on the flanks of the main body; 
and the Turks were not to be allowed to make a 
breach in the main body, or all would be lost; 
(7) finally, when the Turks drew back, or 
feigned retreat, if  the Christians pursued them, 
it must be in one body, and in good order, 
ready at all times to receive and repel a Turkish 
counter-attack. With the army advancing 
always in mass, the Turks would be forced to
flee before it, and retreat from Europe leaving 
everything behind, or risk a decisive engage­
ment at their disadvantage, and be defeated.
The Duke of Burgundy’s active interest in 
the Eastern question was shared, as noted 
above, by other European princes, particularly 
those whose possessions were directly menaced. 
Among them the Italian rulers, though largely 
preoccupied with the prosecution of selfish 
policies that even led them to co-operate with 
the Moslems, were, none the less, disturbed by 
the increasing power of the Ottomans. By the 
middle of the fifteenth century the Turks had 
absorbed the Genoese possessions in the East, 
and had all but crushed the commercial empire 
of Venice. Travellers reported that the infidels’ 
progress could be observed everywhere in the 
Mediterranean area. Across the Adriatic, the 
Turks were now the neighbours of Italy. 
Turkish ships boldly sailed Italian waters. 
Their merchants, envoys, and adventurers 
appeared in Venice, Florence, and in Rome 
itself. In 1480 an Ottoman force, commanded 
by Ghedik Ahmed Pasha, landed in Apulia, 
seized Otranto, and terrorized the surrounding 
countryside for nearly a year. Italian rulers, 
too, employed special agents for espionage 
purposes; and, although these missions were 
carefully disguised, we can learn something of 
them from the writings of the Greek humanist, 
Janus Lascaris, who acted as agent for Lorenzo 
de’ Medici.
Lascaris, who had fled from Constantinople 
when the armies of Mehmed II stormed its 
walls in 1453, had sought refuge successively in 
the Morea, in Crete and in Italy, arriving in 
Venice in 1463 or 1464. Toward the end of the 
century he settled in Florence, where he gave 
public lectures on the Greek language. Lorenzo 
de’ Medici made him director of his library 
and, between the years 1489 and 1492, twice 
sent him on missions to the Levant. Many 
years later, in an address to the Emperor 
Charles V, in which he pleaded for a crusade, 
Lascaris revealed some interesting facts about 
his experiences as a spy, and clearly established 
his qualifications as an authority on Turkish 
affairs.
Having introduced himself as a native of 
Greece and a member of an ancient and noble
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family, driven by the infidels from his home, he 
said that, since childhood, he had studied the 
Eastern problem and laboured to arouse the 
rulers of the West. The aged humanist then 
told of his two missions. Bearing the title of 
Ambassador and armed with credentials ad­
dressed to the Sultan Bayezid II, he had 
travelled extensively through the European 
provinces of the Turkish empire. He had been 
charged with the dual tasks of collecting books 
and manuscripts for the Medici library, and of 
secretly gathering essential information. Alto­
gether he had spent two years in Turkey; and 
he was of the opinion that no living man knew 
more than he about the customs of the Turks 
and their military and civil history.
Although no official report of his missions 
has been discovered, we possess a document, 
written by Lascaris some years later, in which 
he summarized his knowledge of the situation. 
This work, entitled Informatione ad impresa 
contro a Turchi and dated 1508, was composed
at the time of the negotiations for the League of 
Cambrai, when the participating powers were 
paying lip service to the idea of a crusade. 
Since the Informatione was written as propa­
ganda, Lascaris tended to emphasize Turkish 
weaknesses, and failed to provide an objective 
estimate. He included, however, some im­
portant items of intelligence based upon his 
own observations in Turkey and his discussions 
with Greek refugees. At the outset, he gives a 
brief history of the Turks from their origin 
down to the fall of Constantinople. He then 
discusses the conditions that contributed to the 
internal weakness of the Turkish empire at the 
time of writing. He cites, for example, the 
growing antagonism between the renegades and 
the native Moslem population. The govern­
ment is in a state of chaos owing to this conflict 
and to the fact that the Sultan is “  . . . molto 
intermazo et molto fiacco de animo et di corpo.”  
Bayezid is an old man of peaceful temperament, 
who might as well be retired. In fact, his sons
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are already quarrelling over the succession, 
which was not fixed by Turkish law.
Lascaris’ account of the Turkish forces is 
brief and sketchy. He states at once that they 
are not equal to their reputation, and notes that 
there are at the Porte 3,000 knights who call 
themselves slaves. The janissaries number 
7,000 to 10,000, the latter when they are at full 
strength. He describes their dress and their 
weapons which vary considerably from one 
man to the next. The spahis are assembled only 
with difficulty. They are poorly armed. Some 
carry a lance, but others only a sword and a bow. 
They are not in a state of combat readiness. 
The army is weak, moreover, because the Turks 
have lost most of their experienced commanders 
in the war against Egypt. Except for a squadron 
of corsairs, there is no navy to speak of, and 
most of their ships are rotten. In regard to 
logistics, there is a severe shortage of artisans, 
and the Turkish artillery is definitely inferior 
to that of the Western powers. The vast 
stretches of the interior are poorly guarded and 
the fortresses are undermanned.
Lascaris adds some information on the pay 
of the soldiers and the sources of Turkish 
revenue. The knights are paid a ducat for four 
or five days; higher salaries are paid only to the 
200 who are called “  proprii de Signore,”  and 
who accompany the Sultan wherever he goes. 
The infantrymen receive a ducat for ten days, 
and are paid quarterly. The major tax is an 
impost on the hearths of more than 300,000 
Christian families. Those who pay it are some­
times able to retain their horses, and even carry 
a scimitar as the Turks do. Many Christians 
are exempt from the tax, since they serve in the 
territorial guard, especially along the coasts and 
rivers. Lascaris is certain that they will all 
flock to the Christian standard when the time 
is ripe. The villagers, especially the moun­
taineers, are hardy souls who hate the Turks. 
The Turks are afraid to venture into many 
places in the mountains and are able to collect 
the kharaj only if it is voluntarily offered. Often 
they are greeted instead by an attack from a 
hostile Christian band. w
In short, like many of his exiled compatriots, 
Lascaris is optimistic about the aid a Western
force would receive from the Sultan’s Greek 
subjects. He cites the cruelty of the Turks and 
their ill treatment of the Christians, particularly 
the practice of seizing children and turning 
them against their religion and their parents. 
He recommends that agents be sent in advance 
of an expedition to arouse the people, and to 
distribute weapons, including swords inscribed 
with the word “  liberty ”  in Greek. But the 
Western rulers must act quickly, while there 
are still men in Greece who are able to recall 
their former freedom and hold fast to the 
Christian faith. The younger generation is 
succumbing to the conqueror.
It is unnecessary here to examine in detail 
the plan of operation that Lascaris proposed. 
He called for the employment of a combined 
land and sea force under a unified command, 
and outlined the composition of the forces, 
their different routes of approach and overall 
scheme of manoeuvre. Constantinople was the 
ultimate objective; but he also indicated inter­
mediate objectives, such as the fortresses in the 
vicinity of the capital and Gallipoli, the seizure 
of which would deny the Sultan reinforcements 
from .Asia. He discussed the financing of the 
expedition and its logistical support. Through­
out he emphasized the need for surprise and 
the maintenance of good security; for he ad­
mitted that the Turks were swift and crafty. 
The Venetians were to carry out a diversionary 
action by invading the Morea. Every precau­
tion was to be taken to keep the plan a secret; 
and he suggested that a rumour be circulated 
that the objective of the expedition was the 
Holy Land.
The grand expedition that Lascaris and 
others called ior never materialized during the 
Renaissance'period. But this failure was not 
due to a-fack of concern or knowledge on the 
part of Western princes. Although the Euro­
pean rulers of the fifteenth century, being 
devoted to the acquisition of power in the West, 
naturally paid most attention to the problems 
closest home, they were by no means indifferent 
to the Turkish threat. On the contrary, they 
developed an elaborate intelligence network, 
which enabled them to place the Eastern 
question in its proper perspective.
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